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The right to reparation is a well-established principle of international law. As 
stated in the Chorzow Factory case of the Permanent Court of International Justice: "It is 
a principle of international law that the breach of an engagement involves an obligation 
to make reparation in an adequate form." 
The International Law Commission affirmed this principle in its 53rd Session 
when it adopted the Articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. 
Additionally, the right to reparation is firmly embodied in international human rights 
treaties and declarative instruments. It has been further refined by the jurisprudence of a 
large number of international and regional courts, as well as other treaty bodies and 
complaints mechanisms. Additionally, Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a 
Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and 
Humanitarian Law constitute a significant contribution to the codification of norms 
relating to the right to reparation. 
The legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act of a state are governed 
by Part Two of the International Law Commission (ILC) Articles on State Responsibility. 
The core legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act set out in this Part are the 
obligations of the responsible state to cease the wrongful conduct, and to make full 
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act, as provided in 
articles 30-31. 
Chapter II of Part Two deals with the forms of reparation for injury, spelling out in 
further detail the general principle stated in article 31. The forms of reparation dealt 
within Chapter II of Part Two represent ways of giving effect to the underlying obligation 
in article 31 and must be seen against this background. It is for this reason that the ILC 
points out that some flexibility is shown in practice in terms of the appropriateness of 
requiring one form of reparation rather than another, subject to the requirement of full 
reparation for the breach in accordance with article 31. In other words, Chapter II 
provides a flexible system for implementing the obligation to make full reparation. 
The standing of victims of international crimes to seek and obtain effective 
remedies for the harm suffered has received special attention in human rights treaties and 
instruments, as well as in international humanitarian law. In criminal proceedings, the 
standing of victims to seek reparation has been largely limited to the domestic sphere. 
Unlike the Yugoslav and Rwanda tribunals, the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court recognises the standing of victims of crimes under the jurisdiction of the 
Court to seek reparation and stipulates in Article 75 Paragraph 2 of the Statute that the 
"Court may make an order directly against a convicted person specifying appropriate 
reparations to, or in respect of, victims, including restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation." While recognizing that the jurisdiction of the Statute is restricted to 
adjudging the crimes of individuals, Paragraph 6 of Article 75 notes that "[n]othing in 
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this article shall be interpreted as prejudicing the rights of victims under national or 
international law." The process of seeking reparation should be "expeditions, fair, 
inexpensive and accessible," though it is difficult to conceive of how this might be 
achieved in the context of mass atrocity. 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations 
of IHL 
On 13 April 2005, the Commission on Human Rights at its 61st session in Geneva 
adopted the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for 
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law , subsequent to a vote of (40) Yes, (0) No, and (13) 
abstentions. The adoption of the Basic Principles and Guidelines represents the first 
comprehensive codification of the rights of victims of international crimes to reparations, 
remedies, and access to systems of justice. The Basic Principles and Guidelines “do not 
entail new international or domestic legal obligations but identify mechanisms, 
modalities, procedures and methods for the implementation of existing legal obligations 
under international human rights law and international humanitarian law which are 
complementary though different as to their norms.” 
The Basic Principles and Guidelines developed out of the 1985 Basic Principles of 
Justice for Victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, adopted by the Seventh United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, and drafted at a 
regional meeting held in Ottawa, Canada. Although the issue of victim reparation had 
been addressed piecemeal in various international human rights and international 
humanitarian law instruments, the Basic Principles of Justice was the first to articulate in 
one document the rights of victims to have access to justice and the right to reparation for 
their injuries, albeit aimed at victims of domestic crime. The chair of the drafting 
committee at the Ottawa meeting was Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, who later became 
the Independent Expert that drafted the Basic Principles and Guidelines, originally 
presented to the Commission on Human Rights in 2000. After the submission of that 
draft, the Commission, rather than bringing the Basic Principles and Guidelines to a vote 
for adoption, instead placed the text in consultation with interested governments, NGOs, 
and IGOs. There was speculation at the time that certain governments were interested in 
keeping the Basic Principles and Guidelines from being adopted before the United 
Nations World Conference on Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia, and Other 
Related Intolerance was held in Durban, South Africa in September 2001. More 
important, however, was United States’ opposition to the Basic Principles and Guidelines 
on the grounds that they included the right to victim compensation for violations of 
international humanitarian law (hard law), as opposed to being limited simply to 
violations of human rights law (soft law). This position was successfully disputed, 
however, by both scholars and government representatives alike, as international 
humanitarian law and human rights law largely overlap. 
Furthermore, in 2004, the International Court of Justice concluded in an Advisory 
Opinion in the case of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory that 
the two regimes complement one another, and that despite their different legal sources, 
distinctions between the two should not be made. Both international humanitarian law 
and human rights law are the product of treaties and customary international law, as well 
as of general principles of law – all of which are sources of international law. 
It was also noted during the  debates that since the 1907  Hague  Convention, 
225 
 
 
 
 
 
 
international humanitarian law has included the right to compensation, even if it has not 
included all of the victims’ rights of redress contained in the Basic Principles and 
Guidelines. Nevertheless, national legal systems have evolved with respect to the 
recognition of the rights of victims, and the notion of restorative justice is fairly well 
established in a large number of national legal systems. Thus, to extend such concepts of 
victims-oriented justice at the international level is a step in keeping with the 
advancement of the field of human rights, which has been consistently developing since 
the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Other governments opposed the Basic Principles and Guidelines because they 
provided a right to collective action or class action civil suits, which are not known in the 
Civilist legal systems, while some representatives of Common Law systems objected to 
the “partie civile” (civil party) to be included in criminal proceedings because it is a 
practice in Civilist countries unknown to Common Law countries. The Basic Principles 
and Guidelines ultimately blend a variety of techniques from the Common Law, Civilist, 
and Islamic legal systems, which represents a particularly interesting development in 
comparative criminal law and procedure. This was justified on the basis that the Basic 
Principles and Guidelines are premised on the rights of victims, and are therefore not 
bound by traditional legal orthodoxy dividing Civilist, Common Law, and Islamic legal 
traditions. 
1. Essence of Reparation 
The latter half of the twentieth century witnessed unprecedented development and 
codification of international legal standards for the protection of individuals. These 
include numerous universal and regional human rights instruments, the 1949 Geneva 
Conventions and their Additional Protocols of 1977 and the various instruments of 
refugee law. Despite this indispensable step forward in the protection of the individual, 
the reality today is that individuals continue to suffer at the hands of abusive 
governments and in situations of armed conflict. 
Of course, the making of reparation is also extremely important per se for very 
practical reasons, particularly for individuals who have been victims of violations of 
international humanitarian law. Even once the immediate consequences of the violation 
have been dealt with, such persons remain extremely vulnerable. They may need long- 
term medical care, may no longer be able to earn an income and are likely to have lost 
home and belongings. It would be callous and naive to think that an award of 
compensation, for example, would restore victims to the situation they were in prior to 
the violation — re-establish the status quo ante as required by international law. 
Nevertheless, the receipt of timely and adequate compensation is an important element in 
enabling victims to try to rebuild their lives. 
It has been already mentioned that any wrongful act - i.e. any violation of an 
obligation under international law - gives rise to an obligation to make reparation, aim of 
which is to eliminate, as far as possible, the consequences of the illegal act and to restore 
the situation that would have existed if the act had not been committed. 
These same general principles apply to violations of international humanitarian 
law. This was expressly laid down as long ago as 1907 in the Hague Convention (IV) 
respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Article 3 of which stipulates that: 
“[a] belligerent Party which violates the provisions of the (...) Regulations 
[respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land] shall, if the case demands, be liable 
to pay compensation…” 
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A similar requirement to pay compensation for violations of international 
humanitarian law is expressly reiterated in Article 91 of Additional Protocol I. Despite 
this explicit language, it should be noted that the obligation to make reparation arises 
automatically as a consequence of the unlawful act, without the need for the obligation to 
be spelled out in conventions. Although the Hague Convention and Additional Protocol I 
speak only of compensation, reparation for violations of international humanitarian law 
can take various forms, discussed below. 
Acceptance of a duty to make reparation is also often found in treaties concluded 
between belligerents at the end of hostilities. However, this obligation is frequently not 
expressly related to violations of international humanitarian law but rather to violations 
of the prohibition of the use of force, or treaties merely speak even more vaguely of 
“claims arising out of the war”. While many of the losses and claims may, in practice, 
arise from violations of international humanitarian law, there is no need for a 
determination of a violation to be made. One recent and notable exception in this respect 
is the peace agreement of December 2000 between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Inter alia, this 
establishes a neutral Claims Commission charged with deciding, through binding 
arbitration, all claims between the two governments and between private entities for loss, 
damage or injury related to the conflict and resulting from violations of international 
humanitarian law or other violations of international law. This Commission is an 
exception inasmuch as it is expressly tasked with awarding compensation for violations 
of international humanitarian law. 
Reparation may take a number of forms, including: 1) restitution, 2) 
compensation, 3) rehabilitation, and 4) satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. 
While it is recognized that it is generally not possible to restore victims to their original 
situation before the violations occurred, particularly in respect of human rights violations 
that constitute international crimes, restitution may also include restoration of liberty, 
legal rights, social status, family life and citizenship; return to one's place of residence; 
and restoration of employment and return of property. Compensation is understood to 
include any economically assessable damage resulting from the crime, including 
"physical or mental harm, including pain, suffering and emotional distress; lost 
opportunities, including education; material damages and loss of earnings, including loss 
of earning potential; harm to reputation or dignity; and costs required for legal or expert 
assistance, medicines and medical services, and psychological and social services." 
As already noted, article 31 of the ILC articles on state responsibility codifies the 
obligation of reparation. This article, as well as the articles describing specific forms of 
reparation, is formulated as an obligation of the responsible state. In contrast, the 1996 
ILC articles formulated reparation as a right of the injured state. The immediate reason 
for the change is the bifurcation in the 2001 draft articles between the injured state and 
the state that has a legal interest in invoking responsibility. There is also a more 
fundamental policy choice behind it that reflects the function of state responsibility of 
upholding the international rule of law. Formulating reparation as a right of the injured 
state implies that that state can choose not to ask for reparation, and this is not in the 
interest of the international rule of law. In contrast, the ILC commentary maintains that 
the obligation of reparation is the immediate corollary of a state’s responsibility. This is 
in conformity with the PCIJ’s findings in the Chorzów Factory case. Reparation therefore 
is the indispensable complement of a failure to apply a convention and there is no 
necessity for this to be stated in the convention itself.” 
The article on reparation is but one of a number of articles in which the ILC has 
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had difficulty in maintaining the strict separation between primary and secondary 
obligations. The commentary acknowledges that the definition of injury in article 31 
leaves it to the primary obligations to specify what is required in each case. 
2. Legal Nature of Compensation 
Where restitution is not provided or does not fully eliminate the consequences of 
the injury, the responsible state must make compensation, as provided in article 36 of the 
ILC articles. In state practice, compensation is the form  of reparation that is most 
frequently asked and given: it is the usual standard of reparation. It may be noted that the 
jurisprudence of the Iran – United States Claims Tribunal has made a particular 
contribution to the law on compensation. The function of compensation is to address the 
actual losses incurred as a result of the internationally wrongful act. The ILC defines the 
actual losses as ‘financially assessable damage’. Financially assessable damage is 
contrasted with what is sometimes referred to as ‘moral damage’ to the state, i.e. the 
affront or injury caused by a violation of rights not associated with actual damage to 
property or persons. This may lead to confusion because in national systems non-material 
damage such as loss of loved ones, pain and suffering are referred to as ‘moral damage’. 
Under international law such damage is compensable and must be distinguished from 
moral damage to the state. 
As noted above, article 43 provides that a state invoking responsibility can 
legitimately prefer compensation to restitution, but this freedom is not unlimited. The 
ILC commentary states that there are cases where a state may not, as it were, pocket 
compensation and walk away from an unresolved situation, for example one involving 
the life or liberty of individuals or the entitlement of a people to their territory or to self- 
determination. The first situation seems to be characterized by the LaGrand case, in 
which Germany renounced its right to material compensation. Though this was never 
expressly stated by Germany during the proceedings, its decision seems to have been 
related to its contention that the rights at issue constituted individual rights of foreign 
nationals and are to be regarded as human rights of aliens. The ILC commentary does 
not provide guidance concerning other situations in which a state would not be entitled to 
prefer compensation, but it may be noted that the common element in the examples it 
gives is that the rights in question are owed to individuals or peoples. If the ILC intended 
this fact to have consequences for the choice between restitution and compensation, states 
are not free to prefer compensation in case of certain breaches of international 
humanitarian law, even if they do not involve the life or liberty of individuals. 
As mentioned above, prior practice firmly supports the rule that Compensation by 
responsible State for any financially assessable damage, including loss of profits, that its 
wrongful act caused the injured state or its nationals comes into play where restitution is 
not provided or does not fully eliminate the consequences of the harm. In the case of the 
Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project, for example, the ICJ declared it to be “a well-established 
rule of international law that an injured State is entitled to obtain compensation from the 
State which has committed an internationally wrongful act for the damage caused by it.” 
Future litigation will undoubtedly wrestle with the scope of damages, particularly the 
definition of “material” damage to property or other interests of the state and its nationals 
that are “assessable in financial terms.” The concept of financially assessable damage is 
an evolving one, because the determination whether something is “capable of being 
evaluated in financial terms” shifts as markets develop and economic analysis designs 
new methods of valuation. While there is considerable international jurisprudence on 
some headings of damages, litigants and judges are also likely to turn to comparative law, 
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and economic theory and practice, to determine what other claims are capable of being 
financially assessed, because new issues often develop in doctrine and national practice 
before being presented to an international tribunal. The rules themselves are very concise 
on the issue of compensation. Although the stated goal is full reparation, the commentary 
suggests that it may take different forms according to what is appropriate in the particular 
case, in order to ensure compliance with international law by the responsible state while 
affording justice to any injured state. The commentary to several articles makes clear that 
the notion of proportionality or equity plays a role with respect to the different forms of 
reparation, including compensation. The commentary to Article 36 itself states that the 
appropriate heads of compensable damage and the principles of assessment to be applied 
in quantification will vary, “depending upon the content of particular primary obligations, 
an evaluation of the respective behavior of the parties and, more generally, a concern to 
reach an equitable and acceptable outcome.” 
The extent to which a court may adhere to a strict hierarchical approach to 
reparations and require full compensation for all assessable injuries not redressed by 
restitution—as opposed to reserving some matters for nonmonetary satisfaction—may 
depend not only upon the factors cited in the commentary, but upon whether the court in 
question views its primary role as inducing compliance with a legal regime, deciding 
cases, or settling disputes. Settling a dispute in a manner that lessens the likelihood of 
future conflicts or disputes between the parties may or may not conform with the goal of 
full reparations for the injured state, but some international tribunals may consider it as 
important a value as upholding the international rule of law, and as more important than 
ensuring fulfillment of all claims of reparations. While the articles constrain discretion, 
they do not eliminate it. Although the articles provide only general guidance on the 
assessment of compensation, the commentary includes an important and comprehensive 
discussion of precedents indicating the range of compensable losses, headings of damage, 
and methods of quantification. 
Many legal advisers and practitioners will find this analysis particularly useful in 
illustrating developments and variations in the awards of compensation. Replacement 
costs for destroyed property, costs of repairing damaged property, and lost profits are all 
discussed, as are the kinds of harm that are more difficult to measure financially, such as 
loss of life, arbitrary detention and other personal injury, and environmental damage. 
Prior practice demonstrates that these losses while difficult to quantify, are nonetheless 
financially assessable. The commentary approvingly cites the formula Umpire Parker 
used in the Lusitania cases to calculate damages for wrongful death and refers to the use 
of per diem amounts to compensate for unlawful detention. The formula for 
compensating for wrongful death has been utilized as the basis of both human rights and 
diplomatic protection claims. 
In its analysis of property claims, the commentary reflects the global triumph of 
Western market economies. It seems clear that the lack of a viable alternative economic 
model and the growing jurisprudence of tribunals such as the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal, 
the UN Compensation Commission, and human rights bodies have helped build a more 
coherent framework for the assessment of compensation for property losses. The 
commentary notes that awards for property claims are based upon general principles that 
help to assess “(i) compensation for capital value, (ii) compensation for loss of profits, 
and (iii) incidental expenses.” The commentary finds that “fair market value” is the 
method most generally used to determine the capital value of property taken or destroyed, 
but notes that fair market value can be determined by various means, especially where the 
229 
 
 
 
 
 
 
property interests are unique or unusual. Alternative valuation methods are also discussed 
and precedents using them are cited: net book value, liquidation or dissolution value, and 
discounted cash flow are all mentioned, with some helpful indication of the 
circumstances that might favor use of one method over another. The articles also make 
clear that lost profits are not necessarily to be compensated for, but such awards may be 
made where appropriate. Lost-profits claims may be excluded when too speculative or 
not sufficiently established as reflecting a legally protected interest. Reasonably incurred 
incidental expenses are also compensable. 
Lex specialis 
Chapter II of the ILC articles on state responsibility is intended to provide for the 
legal consequences of all internationally wrongful acts of states. However, article 55 
provides that they do not apply where the content of international responsibility is 
governed by special rules of international law. This provision recognizes the residual 
character of the Articles. In principle states are free, when establishing or agreeing to be 
bound by a rule, to specify that its breach shall entail only particular consequences and 
thereby to exclude the ordinary rules of responsibility. With regard to the legal 
consequences of an internationally wrongful act lex specialis can have two effects. One is 
to exclude one or more of the legal consequences provided in Chapter II. The other is to 
change the content of one or more particular consequences provided in Chapter II without 
affecting the other consequences. Whether there is lex specialis with regard to the legal 
consequences of violations of international humanitarian law will be discussed below. 
Lex specialis in the IHL 
There are several provisions in conventional international humanitarian law that 
concern legal consequences of a violation of a primary rule, which could operate as lex 
specialis in the sense of article 55. For the lex specialis principle to apply, it is not enough 
that the same subject matter is dealt with by two provisions. There must be some actual 
inconsistency between them, or else a discernible intention that one provision is to 
exclude the other. In other words, it will depend on the special rule to establish the extent 
to which the more general rules on state responsibility as set out in the ILC Articles are 
displaced by that rule. 
1) One special rule on the legal consequences of a breach of international 
humanitarian 
law is Article 3 of 1907 Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs 
of War on Land. This article provides that a belligerent party which violates the 
provisions of the Regulations annexed to the Convention shall, if the case demands, be 
liable to pay compensation. The article appears to be consistent with article 36 of the ILC 
Articles, although the meanings of the phrase ‘if the case demands’ is not immediately 
clear. The phrase was not included in the original German proposal for the article. A 
number of commentators interpret the phrase as excluding from compensation damage 
that is not financially assessable. A Greek court also found that the provision in Article 3 
according to which the belligerent party shall pay compensation if the case demands 
specifically underline that financially assessable damage must have been caused as a 
result. This interpretation is consistent with article 36 which covers any financially 
assessable damage including loss of profits in so far as this is established in the given 
case. 
Article 3 does not exclude other legal consequences than an obligation of 
compensation as arising from of a violation of the Hague Regulations. The contrary is 
suggested by a statement of the president of the subcommittee of the Second Hague 
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Peace Conference, suggesting that the German proposal was of great interest because it 
attached a sanction to rules, for which there was not yet a sanction in place. Kalshoven 
submits: It may be the case, though, that at the time of the Second Hague Peace 
Conference the general rules were of little practical import in relation to the problem the 
delegates sought to solve, so that in tackling it they were more or less oblivious of such 
general rules. At any rate, the rule they purported to lay down in Article 3, with its 
special characteristics adapted to the perceived needs of the situation, even today is 
entirely capable of coexisting with, and supplementing, the general rules on State 
responsibility. 
2) Another special rule on the legal consequences of a breach of international 
humanitarian 
law is Article 51/52/131/148 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. There is no 
inconsistency between this article and article 36 of the ILC Articles. The article reaffirms 
article 36 by excluding any contractual exemption from claims for compensation by a 
vanquished state. With regard to the question whether the article excludes other legal 
consequences of an internationally wrongful act, the travaux préparatoires make clear 
that compensation was only considered as one of different legal consequences. The report 
of the Committee that drafted Article 51/52/131/148 states: The State remained 
responsible for breaches of the Convention and could not refuse to recognize its 
responsibility on the ground that individuals concerned have been punished. There 
remained, for instance, the liability to pay compensation. 
3) A third special rule with regard to legal consequences for violation of 
international 
humanitarian law is Article 91 of Additional Protocol I. The preparatory work of 
the article indicates that it was intended to have the same meaning as Article 3 of 1907 
Hague Convention IV. This was stated among others by the delegation of Viet Nam when 
it introduced the article. There is neither actual inconsistency between Article 91 and 
article 36 nor a discernible intention that the provision is to exclude other legal 
consequences. 
4) A final lex specialis in international humanitarian law is Article 1, 
paragraph 3, of 
Protocol I to the Hague Convention on Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 
of Armed Conflict. This paragraph obliges state parties to return, at the close of 
hostilities, to the competent authorities of the territory previously occupied, cultural 
property which is in their territory, if such property has been exported by the occupying 
power. This rule limits the freedom of the state invoking international responsibility to 
prefer compensation in lieu of restitution. 
As a matter of principle the legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act 
arise automatically from the wrongful act itself. In other words, their coming into 
existence does not depend on a claim being pressed. The new legal relationship created 
by the internationally wrongful act comes into existence before any injured subject would 
press a claim for reparation. The coming into existence of the obligation to make full 
reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act can a fortiori not 
depend on the admission of responsibility by the responsible entity. The automatic 
coming into existence of legal consequences is underlined by the wording of article 28 of 
the ILC articles on state responsibility. In practice, however, it is difficult to conclude 
that a specific measure is a legal consequence of an internationally wrongful act unless 
the responsible entity states that it is, or the measure is imposed by an international 
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tribunal. 
The ILC does state in its commentary to article 34 of the articles that the “primary 
obligation breached may also play an important role with respect to the form and extent 
of reparation” 
It has already been established that the provisions in international humanitarian 
law on the legal consequences of a breach of its rules are consistent with the general 
principles concerning legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act. It seems that 
the legal consequences of a breach of international humanitarian law would not 
necessarily have been different from the legal consequences of the breach of another 
international obligation. 
3. Conclusion 
In the concluding part of report I would like to review the idea towards creating a 
Permanent International Claims Commission (PICC) for Victims of Violations of 
International Humanitarian Law shortly. Moreover, as you have been observing throught 
the whole text of the present report i did never mention an ongoing Russian-Ukrainian 
international armed conflict, but i have put the Claims Commission issue at the end of 
my paper because i do think this tool might work as an effective institute to settle the 
legal consequences of the war in the eastern ukraine, after the political decisions are 
made of course. 
Basic Principles and Guidelines adopted by the UN Commission on Human Rights 
at its 2005 session are a welcome addition to the arsenal of international human rights 
instruments because they offer a much needed comprehensive codification of the rights 
of victims of gross violations of human dignity. But the Principles focus on questions of 
substantive law only. They do not suggest which kind of institutions would help ensure 
the effective exercise of remedies. Nevertheless, without such institutions the Principles 
are unlikely to have the intended effect. So number of Scholars tries to take the Basic 
Principles a step further by proposing the establishment of a new, permanent international 
body that would have the competence to award monetary compensation and restitution of 
property to victims of violations of international humanitarian law. One of the main 
directions is of course compensation and restitution of property issue. 
Professor Kamminga considers that during the past 25 years considerable 
experience has been gained with various types of ad hoc international claims bodies 
designed to perform this function. The three most notable ones are the Iran-United States 
Claims Tribunal, the United Nations Compensation Commission and the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Claims Commission. A quick overview of the role played by these three bodies offers an 
interesting picture of accumulated experience since each mechanism has been a 
conscious attempt to overcome the perceived disadvantages of its predecessor. 
A significant side effect of the establishment of a PICC would be the authoritative 
case law that would be produced by the commissions set up under its auspices. 
Jurisprudence emanating from ad hoc bodies with a peculiar one off mandate, such as the 
UNCC, can easily be discounted because of the unique circumstances under which they 
were operating. Case law produced under the auspices of the PICC, on the other hand, 
would carry the stamp of authority. Establishment of the PICC is thus likely to help 
resolve some of the substantive legal questions concerning the rights of individuals under 
international humanitarian law raised in this volume. As experience with regional human 
rights courts and the ad hoc international criminal tribunals has shown, some of the more 
intricate questions concerning the status of individuals in international law are more 
likely to be resolved by international case law than by international legislation. 
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The idea of a Permanent International Claims Commission may appear far-fetched 
at a time when the world’s only superpower is working hard to frustrate the work of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) and increasing its pressure on the ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals to close down their operations as soon as possible. But, of course, 
‘fancy’ and ‘far-fetched’ are precisely the labels that were given to the initial proposals to 
establish for example an ICC itself or the post of UN High Commissioner for Human 
Rights. When the political climate is ripe even the most radical proposals may suddenly 
gain momentum. 
On the basis of these fragmentary considerations, the conclusion is justified that 
few examples exist where victims are endowed with a right of their own to a remedy for 
violations of international humanitarian law. While developments at the national level in 
the Netherlands and in the United States under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture 
Victims Protection Act are promising, many cases in which individuals have brought 
claims under Article 3 of the 1907 Hague Convention before national courts have failed 
because the courts did not recognize that individuals have standing against the State. 
They regarded the right in that article as one that only States can exercise on behalf of 
individuals. At the international level, there has been some progress in the means open to 
victims for the defense of their rights before international bodies, but the practice of 
international bodies providing remedies to victims of violations of IHL is ad hoc and is 
not organized. There is no general mechanism that would allow victims to assert their 
rights under IHL. 
At the same time, to say that victims have no individual legal standing in IHL 
would not be a correct description of the actual state of affairs. Although States are still 
the traditional subjects of IHL, victims have also, in an increasing number of cases, 
achieved recognition as subjects of IHL. In the years to come, the UN Principles on the 
Right to a Remedy will undoubtedly lead to greater attention to application of IHL in 
domestic and international courts, and thus to an injection of IHL norms in the approach 
to individual remedies. The UN document is a welcome move towards bringing about 
remedies for victims of violations of IHL. It still has nonbinding status. However, this 
does not necessarily negate its potential influence, for there are many examples of similar 
documents exerting influence in litigation. 
As Sassòli notes, States are less and less the sole players on the international 
scene, and even much less so in armed conflicts. Rules on State responsibility, in 
particular as codified by the ILC, are exclusively addressed to States individually and as 
members of the international society. Their possible impact on better respect for 
international humanitarian law  should therefore  not be overestimated, especially not 
when compared to the preventive and repressive mechanisms directed at individuals. The 
ILC Articles and their Commentary do clarify, however, many important questions 
concerning implementation of international humanitarian law and may therefore help to 
improve the protection of war victims by States, for in the harsh reality of many 
present-day conflicts States continue to play a major direct or indirect role, 
particularly if they are not allowed to hide behind the smokescreen labels of 
“globalization”, “failed States” or “uncontrolled elements”. They are responsible, under 
the general rules on attribution of unlawful acts, much more often than they would wish. 
Furthermore, violations do have consequences, not only humanitarian consequences for 
the victims but also legal consequences for the responsible State. 
Finally, through the combined mechanisms of international humanitarian law and 
of the general rules on State responsibility, all other States are able and are obliged to act 
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when violations occur. Ideally, they should do so through universal and regional 
institutions, an aspect perhaps neglected by the ILC. Recent events show, however, a 
certain return to unilateralism once a situation really matters. The Articles on State 
responsibility, applied to IHL violations, remind us that all States can react lawfully and 
clarify to a certain extent what States should do. This may be the most important message 
of the foregoing analysis. Although there unquestionably has to be the necessary political 
will, the need to respect and ensure respect for international humanitarian law is not a 
matter of politics, but rather a matter of law. 
 
